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Introduction

This lite paper outlines the foundation of a secure, quantum-resistant wallet protocol on Ethereum, bridging the gap between today’s blockchain security needs and tomorrow’s quantum challenges.

The advent of quantum computing poses significant risks to existing cryptographic protocols, particularly those based on algorithms like the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), widely used in blockchain technologies. To address these risks, this paper introduces a Quantum-Resistant Wallet Protocol (QRWP) for the Ethereum blockchain, leveraging lattice-based cryptography and robust design methodologies to ensure post-quantum security.

Background

Quantum Computing and Cryptographic Vulnerabilities

Quantum computing utilizes quantum mechanics principles to perform computations exponentially faster than classical computers in certain domains. Algorithms like Shor’s algorithm threaten traditional cryptographic methods by solving the discrete logarithm and integer factorization problems with unprecedented speed. Consequently, cryptographic schemes such as RSA, ECDSA, and Diffie-Hellman are deemed quantum-insecure.

Example: Breaking RSA with Shor’s Algorithm

RSA Key Generation:

Two large prime numbers, pp and qq, are chosen.
The product

Lattice-Based Cryptography

Lattice-based cryptography is one of the most promising candidates for post-quantum cryptography. It relies on problems like the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP), Learning With Errors (LWE), and Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE), which remain computationally infeasible for quantum computers due to their structure. This inherent resistance stems from quantum computers’ limitations in exploiting the superposition principle for misaligned quantum states.

Vulnerabilities in Current Wallet Solutions

Current cryptocurrency wallets, particularly those utilizing elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), are inherently vulnerable to quantum computing threats. Wallets rely on ECC-based private-public key pairs for signing and authorizing transactions. Quantum computers running Shor’s algorithm can efficiently solve the discrete logarithm problem, which forms the security backbone of ECC, enabling an attacker to derive private keys from publicly available information. This means that an adversary with access to a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could impersonate a wallet owner, signing unauthorized transactions or transferring assets without detection.

Additionally, many wallets use symmetric encryption algorithms to secure locally stored private keys and sensitive data. While these algorithms are not immediately broken by quantum computers, Grover’s algorithm significantly reduces their effective key strength, making them susceptible to brute-force attacks. For example, a 256-bit symmetric key would effectively offer only 128 bits of security against a quantum attack, necessitating stronger or hybrid cryptographic measures to ensure safety.